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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GERTRUDE GIBBS, LYNN P. 
GIBBS and GAYE GIBBS SMITH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation, 
Defend(JJYI,t and Respondent. 
Civil No. 7710 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the Statement of Facts in appellants' 
brief is, in general, accur,ate, we believe it is insufficient 
in detail to enable the Court to understand fully the 
circumstances surrounding the accident out of which 
this case arose. Therefore, we have prepared our own 
·statement of facts. 
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4: 
The intersection where the accident occurred is 
located in a residential area in the city of Ogden. 23rd 
Street is a through street running east and west and 
is fully paved with a black top surface (Tr. 29). It is 
55 feet wide from curb to curb, as is Jefferson Avenue, 
which intersects it at a right angle (stipulated diagram). 
West of the intersection, 23rd Street has a slight down-
ward slope, but the slope is so slight that it is still pos-
sible to stand in the center of the Jefferson Avenue inter-
section and see the shoes of a man standing at the inter-
section of 23rd ;Street and Adams Avenue, which is 
one city block to the west (Tr. 87). A person approach-
ing 23rd Street on Jefferson Avenue from the north 
is required to stop at the stop sign which is near the 
north curb line of 23rd Street. Either at that point 
or at a point ten steps to the north, such a person can see 
to the west as far as Adams A venue, or a distance of 
one block, without difficulty (Tr. 87). The trees which 
are shown in the stipulated diagram on the north side 
of 23rd Street between the curb and the sidewalk are 
either so small or so widely spaced that visibility of a 
person on Jefferson A venue approaching the inter-
section is not impaired 'by them (Exhibits C and D), 
and particularly, the headlights of an approaching car 
on 23rd Street would be clearly visible· (Tr. 87). The 
intersection is lighted by an ordinary street light in 
the northeast corner, but there is no other illumination 
on the intersection. 
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The accident happened on November 24, 1948, at 
about 6 :40 A.~I., which was about 45 minutes before 
sunrise (Tr. 68). The respondent's agent, Ronald D. 
:Jiullen, was driving respondent's taxicab easterly on 
23rd Street en route to pick up a passenger at a point 
east of Jefferson Avenue, and was driving at a speed 
of 20 to 25 miles per hour. It was dark, the street was 
wet, and it was raining. The windshield wipers of the 
cab were operating, and the headlights were on bright 
(Tr. 55). The butterfly window on the driver's side 
was open (Tr. 64) to allow air to enter the cab to pre-
vent fogging. No other automobile traffic was on the 
road. As Mullen reached the intersection, he "was ob-
serving the full view out of'' his windshield, and his 
headlights diffused out at an angle, so that he could 
observe things on either side of the ·cab (Tr. 61). The 
first and only thing he ·saw was the front wheel of a 
bicycle in the diffused angle of t~e left front head-
light. He never saw the man on the I bicycle prior to 
impact. Although the Ogden City ordinance in effect 
at the time required it (Tr. 74), the bicycle had no 
light on it (Tr. 57). 
Mullen cramped the wheel of the cab to the righ~, 
so that he was going in a southeasterly direction (Tr. 
62), and the bicycle wheel was turned so that it was 
going in a south by southeast direction. The cab struck 
the. bicycle a glancing blow on the front mud guard 
(Tr. 55-58). Mullen stopped the cab quickly, and says· 
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6 
that he did so within 10 to 15 feet (Tr. 55), although 
the position of the cab as indicated on the stipulated 
diagran1 is at the southeast corner of the intersection 
at the -curb. Mullen got out of the cab and for the 
first time saw the man, F. Parley Gibbs, who had ap-
parently been riding the bicycle (Tr. 55). Gibbs, the 
deceased, picked up the bicycle with Mullen's assistance, 
and they carried it to the front of the cab where the 
bicycle was inspected for damage in the light from 
the cab's headlights. The deceased insisted that he was 
"all right" and said that the bicycle was "damaged 
a little bit" (Tr. 55). Apparently no further conversa-
tion was had between Mullen and the deceased. At 
least, Mullen did not testify to any further conversa-
tion, nor did the witness, Tyler (Tr. 50), who appeared 
on the scene just as he heard a voice say, "I am all 
right.'' 
The deceased pushed or carried his bicycle to the 
north, back up Jefferson A venue where he lived, and 
1\:fullen continued on his way for a half a block where 
he picked up his fare, the witness 0 'Neill. 
Although there is no evidence on this point, it has 
been assumed by both sides to the case that the deceased, 
after placing his bicycle against the side of his house, 
walked or ran from that point south to 24th Street, a 
distance of one and one-third blocks, and then turned 
west to Washington Boulevard, a distance of two blocks, 
ol 
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7 
where he got a bus on the corner of Washington Boule-
vard and ~4th Street (Tr. 23). The deceased sat in his 
seat in such a position as to giYe the appearance of 
being ill, and ~ubsequent examination revealed that he 
had died. 
In the n1eantime, ~Iullen, after delivering his pas-
senger to his destination, realized he had forgotten to 
obtain the name of the n1an on the bicycle, and that he 
would need to know the nan1e to make his accident 
report. He then drove back to the area of the accident 
and noti~ed a bicycle leaning against the house, ·but, 
inasmuch as the hour was early and there were no 
lights on in the house, he decided to return to the house. 
later in the day to obtain the information (Tr. 58). 
When he did so, he discovered that the deceased had 
passed away as indicated. 
Thereafter this action was instituted by the heirs 
of the deceased against the cab company and Mullen. 
However, Mullen was never served vYith summons, and 
the action proceeded to trial as against the cab company 
only. Trial was had on appellants' second amended 
complaint and respondent's answer. The complaint 
alleged negligence in general terms, and the answer 
pleaded a defense of contributory negligence in general 
terms with the specific allegation that the deceased had 
violated the Ogden ordinance by f1ailure to have a light, 
lamp or lantern connected to his bicycle. Upon trial, 
it developed that there were no eye witnesses to the 
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8 
accident, except the witness Mullen, and so the evi-
dence in the record concerning the details of the accident 
comes from Mullen and from the inferences drawn 
from the physical evidence available. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
granted a motion by respondent for a directed verdict. 
The trial court, at the request of appellants, made an 
inspection of the accident scene and reported his find-
ings beginning at (Tr. 87). His decision was announced 
as being based upon the fact that the deceased had 
an opportunity to see, and could have seen, for an en-
tire block as the car approached, and that his failure 
to see was negligence, which would concur with negli-
gence of the automobile driver (Tr. 87, 88). Appel-
lants have appealed from the judgment entered upon 
the directed verdict ( T. 018). 
After the notice of appeal was served and filed, 
counsel for both sides joined in the preparation of the 
stipulated diagram, which has been made a part of 
this record. The diagram was prepared in an effort 
to assist the Court in visualizing the accident scene, 
and to overcome some of the confusion which exists in 
the record because of the fact that the case was tried 
with the use of a blackboard to which witnesses re-
ferred, but which renders their testimony meaningless 
unless the blackboard is available for examination. The 
diagram was prepared from notes of counsel, and ap-
pears to be accurate except that the stop sign protect-
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ing 23rd Street fron1 traffic from the north is shown 
on the diagram to have been north of the sidewalk, 
whereas the photog·raphs (Exhibits C and D) reveal 
that it was located between the sidewalk and the curb 
line, thus making the stop sign closer to 23rd Street 
than it is indicated on the diagram. 
STATE.MENTS OF POINTS 
L THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT ACTED 
WITH DUE CARE CANNOT STAND WHERE THE EVI-
DENCE, AND THE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, 
SHOW THAT DUE CARE WAS NOT EXERCISED. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THAT F. PARLEY GIBBS, THE DE-
CEASED, WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH CON-
TRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH. 
Ill. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED, EVEN IF THE GROUNDS ASSIGNED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE, WHERE, AS 
HERE, IT APPEARS FROM THE ENTIRE RECORD THAT 
A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT. 
AR~UMENT 
L THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT ACTED 
WITH DUE CARE CANNOT STAND WHERE THE EVI-
DENCE, AND THE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, 
SHOW THAT DUE CARE WAS NOT EXERCISED. 
The respondent agrees that there is 'a recognized 
principle of law to the effect that deceased is presumed 
to have exercised due care for his own safety. But, it 
is ou~ position that this presumption has no application 
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where there is evidence from which it can be determined 
how the accident happened and where circumstances 
exist which point inescapably to the conclusion that 
due care could not have been exercised. As we shall 
point out, this accident would not have happened had 
due care been exercised by the decedent, and therefore, 
his lack of due care will be shown to have been one of 
the concurring causes of the accident, if not the sole 
proximate cause. 
First, let it be clear that we do not agree with the 
statement of fact in appellants' brief to the effect that 
there is no evidence in the record as to whether decedent 
was riding his bicycle, pushing it, or merely standing 
in the intersection. Any ·claim by appellants that the 
decedent was not riding his bicycle is pure afterthought, 
since their entire case was presented to the lower court 
on the basis that the decedent was riding his bicycle. 
No mention is made of this subject in appellants' com-
plaint, or first amended complaint, but in their second 
amended complaint, in paragraph 3, appears the allega-
tion that decedent was crossing the street "upon his 
bicycle" (emphasis added). Further, in plaintiffs' 
opening statement to the jury (Tr. 2), it was asserted 
that plaintiffs would show that decedent "left home 
on his bicycle to report for work." 
While it may be said that these are mere assertions, 
it is logical to suppose that the bicycle was used to ride 
to work, as it apparently had been in the past. Further, 
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this theory finds support in the t>Yidence in a particular 
apparently overlooked by appellants: as detailed in 
our staten1ent of facts, the front wheel of the bicycle 
was first seen within the edge of the bean1 of light cast 
by the cab ~s left front headlight. The cab was immedi-
ately swerved so that its course was changed by 40° 
to the southeast. If the ·bicycle had been standing still, 
or moving at a ''walking" rate of speed of 3 or 4 miles 
per hour, the cab would not have struck the bicycle, 
because the path of the cab, after the swerve, would 
have been to the south of the bicycle. The bicy~e had 
to be moving at a "riding" speed of 10 to 15 miles per 
hour in order to move from the north or left side of 
the path of travel of the cab into the area of impact 
after the swerve of the cab. The logical inference to 
be drawn from these physical facts, and from the fact 
that a man on the way to work on a downhill street, 
would be riding, not pu~hing the bicycle or standing 
still with it, is that the decedent was riding his bicycle 
at the time of the collision. Further evidence leading 
irresistibly to this conClusion is found in the fact that 
while the impact on the bicycle was at the front mud 
guard, the large bicycle seat was ''practically torn off'' 
(Tr. 77), indicating that the seat was bearing weight 
at the time of impact on the front of the bicycle. 
Thus, there is evidence from which can ·be gleaned 
a course of conduct by the deceased prior to impact. 
This evidence, when coupled with the evidence of the 
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12 
respondent's driver, and applied to the physical facts 
relating to the intersection, ~provides ample proof of 
what happened. In such circumstances, the presump-
tion of due care by the deceased collapses. As was said 
by this Court in Perrin v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 59 
Utah 1, the presumption "is applicable only in the 
absence of evidence as to just how the accident happened. 
There was no eye witness. It is only in such cases 
that litigants are entitled to an instruction" on the 
presumption. 
An examination of the cases cited by appellants 
In support of their claim of this presumption reveals 
that the presumption is allowed in cases where there 
is no evidence of any kind as to what happened. Typical 
are the cases of Lewis v. Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 
123 P. 97, (where the dismembered body of the deceased 
was found strewn by the defendant's track, and no one 
saw the accident); Davis v. D.~ R. G. W. R. R. Co., 45 
Utah 1, 142 P. 705, (where a witness saw decedent walk 
toward the railroad track, but didnt see what happened 
until after impact, and therefore, could not say if 
decedent looked up the track or, if he had looked, 
whether he could have seen the train); Barke.r v. Savas, 
52 Utah 262, 172 P. 672, (where the body of a six year 
old boy was found near his tricycle at the side of the 
road. However, there was affirmative evidence that 
decedent was not negligent, but was riding his tricycle 
:11 
tra 
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where he should have been. There were no eye wit-
nesses to the accident, and there were admissions from 
the defendant driver to be considered by the court). 
In those cases eited by appellants in which the 
presumption is discussed, but discarded as inapplica-
ble to the facts of the case, there are many statements 
of abstract principles of la\Y approving the presump-
tion. .Among these cases are Mingus v. Olsson, (Utah, 
191=9), 201 P. (2d) 495, and Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. 
& Depot Co., (Utah, 1951), 235 P. (2d) 515, in each of 
which the Court stated that the presumption could not 
apply because of the existence of evidence as to the 
conduct of the decedent prior to the impact. From 
these statements, it is clear that the principle an-
nounced in the Perrin case, supra, is still the law in 
this state, and the presumption is not indulged except 
in the absence of evidence as to how the ,accident hap-
pened. The question of whether or not the presumption 
of due care should apply is 'a question to be decided 
upon the facts of each case. 
The presumption discussed herein is not as broad 
as is indicated by some of the excerpts from cases 
quoted in appellants' brief. For example, appellants 
quote verbatim a jury instruction from the ease of Davis 
v. R. R. Co., supra, which they claim this Court held 
"proper." The instruction stated that the presumption 
was that the deceased ''looked and listened'' for the 
train. The Supreme Court stated, at pages 9 and 10 of 
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45 Utah, that this instruction came from an earlier case 
and that just because it was approved once does not 
mean it should be used as a model. The instruction 
was faulty, the Court said, as being argumentative when 
it stated that the deceased was presumed to have "looked 
and listened.'' This is so, said the Court, because while 
"the court may inform the jury that, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, a person exposed to danger 
is presumed to have exercised due care for his safety," 
yet ''there is no presumption that he did a particular 
thing." 
One of the more recent expressions on this question 
by the Utah Supreme Court is found in the case of 
Gren v. Norton, (1949), 213 P. (2d) 356. In that case, 
the deceased drove his vehicle into the path of the de-
fendant's truck, which was coming from the deceased's 
right on a through highway. It was undisputed that 
the deceased had an opportunity for an unobstructed 
view of the road to his right for several hundred feet, 
and while some witnesses gave testimony indicating that 
the deceased had not looked in that direction until juf:'t 
before impact, there was other evidence which indicated 
that it could not be determined with certainty whether 
the deceased had or had not turned his head sufficiently 
far to the north to observe the approach of the defend-
ant's truck. The contention was m~ade that, at the most, 
the deceased was guilty of an error in judgment in 
estimating that he could cross the highway safely, and 
I I WI 
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that in addition, he was entitled to a presumption that 
he used due care for his own safety. This Court, speak-
ing through Justice Latimer, answered these conten-
tions in the following language : 
''The physical evidence and deceased's acts 
and conduct were such that any presumption of 
due care has been destroyed. One look to the 
north at any time after deceased cleared the 
east lanes would have apprised a reasonably 
careful driver that the movement across the west 
lanes would not ·be made in safety." 
It is our contention that the same statement can be 
made in answer to appellants' argument in this case. 
One look to the right by the deceased, F. Parley Gibbs, 
would have apprised him that he could not cross 23rd 
Street in safety, and from all the evidence available 
in the record, it is clear that the presumption of due 
care, if it ever existed in this case, has been destroyed. 
From the foregoing cases, we urge that Utah law 
on the presumption of due care is as follows : 
(a) a person in a place of danger is presumed 
to have exercised due care for his safety, if there is no 
evidence as to how the accident happened. 
(b) the presumption does not extend to a pre-
sumption that he did or did not do any particular act. 
(c) that where there is uncontradicted testimony 
showing how the accident happened, and where that 
testimony, together with the physical facts available 
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and the logical inferences to be drawn from the testi-
mony and physical facts, all point irresistibly to the 
conclusion that the accident would not have happened 
had the deceased used due care, the presumption is 
inapplicable and cannot be considered in deciding the 
issue. 
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant 
case, it is at once apparent that the presumption of 
due care cannot be relied upon to decide this case. If 
the deceased had looked to his right, at or north of the 
stop sign, it is undisputed that he could have seen the 
cab for at least one city block. If he was riding his 
bicycle, or if he was pushing it, he still had ample op-
portunity to obey the law, and either wait at the stop 
sign, or yield the right of way to a vehicle on a throu~h 
street. Had he done so, no accident could have, hap-
pened. It is not likely that he would have consciously 
proceeded into the intersection in the path of the cab, 
and it is therefore the only logical conclusion that he 
did not look to the right and never saw the cab. How-
ever, whether he looked, and paid no heed, or whether 
he failed to look at all, the result is the same. He was 
negligent in either particular, and he cannot be said 
to have exercised due care. Added to these factors is 
the additional omission by the deceased in failing to 
have a light or lamp upon his bicycle, although required 
to do so by law. 
l!! 
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In those cases diseussed by appellants where a 
deceased entered upon a railroad track and was killed, 
the Court has applied the presumption because a con-
flict existed as to whether or not the deceased, had he 
looked, could haYe seen the train. Thus, it became a 
fact question as to whether his failure to look could 
have contributed to the accident. See Davis v. R. R. Co., 
supra. In the case at bar, no such conflict exists, be-
cause it is clear and certain, from this record, that the 
deceased, had he looked, could have seen the cab, or, 
at least, its headlights. The trial court so found after 
his inspection (Tr. 87). The only way the deceased 
could have failed to know about the cab was if he failed 
to look. Therefore, reasonable minds cannot differ on 
the statement that he could not have exercised due care. 
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the pre-
sumption of due care, if it ever existed under the facts 
of this case, has been effectively overcome and is not a 
factor to be considered, in the light of the evidence and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THAT F. PARLEY GIBBS, THE DE-
CEASED, WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH CON-
TRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH. 
The appellants have discussed this phase of the 
case under their Points numbered II and III. Their 
approach is nothing more or less than :an attempt to 
urge the Court to overrule a long line of decisions 
which hold in substance that where a person enters a 
through highway in the face of oncoming traffic, and 
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either fails to keep a lookout for such traffic, or, look-
ing, fails to heed what he sees, and his failure in either 
regard contributes to the accident, he will be held to 
have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. 
There are many cases decided by this Court which 
are based upon these fundamental principles, and among 
them are the following: Bullock v. Luke, 98 P. (2d) 350; 
Conklin v. Walsh, 193 P. (2d) 437; Hickok v. Skinner, 
190 P. (2d) 514; Gren v. Norton, supra. 
Only one of these cases, namely, the Hickok case, 
is cited in appellants' brief. We submit that these de-
cisions correctly state the law, .and even if the Court 
should desire to re-examine the principles ·announced in 
these cases, the facts in the case at bar do not justify 
such a re-examination. 
The principles announced in these and related ·cases 
indicate clearly that appellants were not entitled to 
go to the jury in this case, even when the evidence 
is viewed in the light most favorable to them. Gibbs 
approached a through highway apparently as he had 
done on many previous occasions. The intersection is 
but a few doors form his hnme, and it is logical to as-
sume that he was familiar with it. Perhaps it was this 
familiarity which led to his disregard of the fundamental 
rules of safety and the traffic laws of this state. In 
any event, it is undisputed that for at least ten steps 
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before he reached the stop sign, which is a few feet 
north of the curb line, he had an unobstructed view of 
the street to his right, for at least the distance of one 
city block. No other traffic was on the road, and nothing 
in the record indicates that any condition existed which 
would confuse him or justify his inability to see the 
headlights of the approaching cab. As a practical mat-
ter, he could have seen the headlights of the cab for 
a distance of more than one city ·block, and the headlights 
would have been clearly visible to him at any point in 
which the cab might have been had he looked for it .. This 
would be the fact, whether he was riding his bicycle 
or walking along pushing it, or standing still at the 
entrance to the intersection. As previously indicated, 
however, the logical inference is that he was riding the 
bicycle. 
If he stopped at the stop sign and then proceeded 
into the street in the path of the oncoming taxicab, he 
was guilty of negligence in entering 23rd Street at a 
time when another vehicle was approaching so close as 
to constitute an immediate hazard. He was guilty of 
this negligence whether he failed to look for the taxi-
cab, or whether he looked and failed to heed what he 
saw. 
If the deceased did not stop at the intersection, 
but proceeded blindly into it, he was equally guilty 
of negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout and 
also in failing to stop at the entrance to a through 
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highway. In addition to these failures, he compounded 
his negligence by operating a bicycle on the streets of 
Ogden at a time prior to 30 minutes before sunrise 
without having a la:mv, on the front of the bicycle, as 
required by the ordinances of the city of Ogden. 
In addition to those omissions, it is quite clear 
that the deceased could have avoided the .accident at 
any time, had he exercised ordinary ·care, either by 
stepping off the bicycle, or ·by turning the wheel, or by 
braking to a stop in the distance of more than 271/2 feet 
which he had to traverse in order to reach the area of 
impact, as indicated on the stipulated diagram. So far 
as can be determined, he did none of these things, and 
took no action to avoid the accident, unless it ·can be 
said that the position of the front wheel of the bicycle 
as the respondent's driver turned the wheels of the 
cab, indicates that Gibbs had made an effort to turn 
the bicycle from a due south course to his left in order 
to .avoid the area of impact. 
No assertion is made by appellants, and indeed, 
none could be made, that Gibbs did not have a duty of 
I ~ 
due care as he approached the intersection. He was 1 r 
governed by the same rules as a motorist, and this is so 
whether he was riding his bicycle or was pushing it. As 
was said by this Court in the case of Mingus v. !Olsson, 
supra, 
. 11 
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''the rights of pedestrians to the use of the 
public streets are the same as those of motor-
ists-neither greater nor less. Hence, a pedes-
trian crossing a public street * * * , :although he 
may have the right of way over vehicular traffic, 
nonetheless has the duty to o•bserve for such 
traffic.'' 
In view of this principle of law, we assert that Gibbs 
had the same duty of care as would be required of 
a motorist who entered 23rd Street from Jefferson 
Avenue on the morning in question. This being so, his 
conduct must be judged in the same manner as this 
Court has judged the conduct of drivers who have been 
involved in intersection collisions in the cases previ-
ously cited in this portion of our argument. 
An examination of the cited cases makes it abund-
antly clear that no person can enter an intersection 
such as the one involved in this case without observing 
conditions to his left and to his right and thereafter 
paying heed to what his observation reveals. This is 
a fundamental doctrine that has been recognized by the 
courts in steadily increasing numbers since the advent 
of the automobile. Our examination does not reveal that 
the Supreme Court of Utah has varied from these 
principles down to the time of the writing of this 
brief. Appellants seem to argue to the contrary, and 
take comfort from a number of. decisions, the latest 
of which is the case of Lowder v. Holley, (1951), 233 
P. (2d) 350. The Lowder ease does not represent any 
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principle different from that for which we contend. 
It was a case in which the triai judge was the trier of 
the fact, and the Supreme Court, in its opinion, simply 
says that there was evidence upon which the trial court 
could have found that the plaintiff was justified in 
assuming that the defendant would exercise ordinary 
care. Under the facts of the case, says the Court, plain-
tiff's failure to see the truck would in no way have 
contributed to the accident. What this holding means, 
as we view the matter, is simply this: that the plaintiff 
in the Lowder case might have been negligent, but he 
was not necessarily contributorily negligent, since his 
negligence could not have contributed to the accident, 
and the negligence of the driver of the a:pposing car was 
the sole and proximate cause of the accident. The facts 
in the Lowder case differ greatly from the facts in this 
case, and the Lowder decision is therefore not control-
ling here. In the Lowder case, the evidence was clear, 
and the Court found, that the driver of the defendant's 
truck was speeding, which, of course, would have affected 
the appearance of the situation at the time the plaintiff 
in that case was required to look for oncoming traffic . 
. Further, Lowder looked for traffic and saw none. His 
view of the road was not complete. In the case at bar, 
the evidence is uncontradicted that the defendant's taxi-
cab was proceeding at a safe speed and within both the 
letter and spirit of the speed ordinances. The view 
of the road available to the deceased was complete and 
unobstructed. The only evidence in the record as to 
I, 
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speed is that of the respondent'~ driYer, which is that 
he was travelling :20 to :25 miles per hour. The distance 
within which he stopped the taxicab on the wet street 
bears out this testin1ony. As an additional indication 
of its accuracy, ''"e haYe the fact that so far as is dP-
termined by the record, the deceased 1nade no accusation, 
started no argun1ent, and made no protestations of in-
nocence in the seconds immediately following the acci-
dent. It is logical to assume that had the deceased been 
of the opinion that the taxicab was going at an excessive 
speed and that that belief caused confusion in his mind, 
he would have made some accusation to that effect. It 
is equally logical, of course, that respondent's driver 
would have been careful to omit such an accusation from 
his recital of the facts, but there is the testimony of the 
disinterested witness Tyler, who appeared on the scene 
in time to hear the deceased say, "I am all right," and 
who did not testify concerning any further conversa-
tion. Had there been any further conversation, particu-
larly of an argumentative nature, Tyler no doubt would 
have recalled it. 
The Lowder decision represents no new doctrine, 
in view of its facts, and a careful reading of the opinion 
convinces us that the Court, by that decision, did not 
overrule, either expressly or by implication, the well-
considered and esta'blished decisions found in the cases 
of Bullock v. Luke, Hickok v. Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh 
and Gren v. Norton, supra. 
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The other cases cited by appellants in support of 
the ''doctrine'' of the Lowder case likewise bear no 
resemblance to the case at bar. In the case of Spack-
man v. Carson, (Utah, 1950), 216 P. (2d) 640, the 
Court saia, at page 642, '' rrhis case stands strictly on 
its own facts''. The Court then goes on to say that 
the case is a close one, and it is clear from the opinion 
that the case was not without difficulty. In each of the 
other cases cited by appellants, and particularly in the 
case of Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P. (2d) 
127, there were conflicts in the evidence which could 
only be resolved by jury consideration. No such con-
flict appears in our case. 
It is true that only in a clear case should a verdict 
be directed against a plaintiff upon the ground of con-
tributory negligence. What is usually meant by "a 
clear case'' is a case in which the minds of reasonable 
men could not differ on the facts rpresented. There 
is no possibility in this case that the minds of reason-
able men could differ as to the cause, or at least the 
contributing cause, of this accident. Had Gibbs not 
entered the intersection into the path of the respond-
ent's taxicab, this accident would not have occurred. 
As has been demonstrated, his entrance into the inter-
section under the circumstances prevailing at the time, 
could only have been the result of negligence. His 
negligence, therefore, started an unbroken chain of 
events which led to the impact, and even if it be said 
that the respondent's driver was negligent, there can 
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be no doubt that Gibbs' negligence ach_'d in concert 
with, and concurred with, the negligence of the cab 
driver to bring about this accident. Under such cir-
cumstances, we assert it would have been error for 
the trial court to deny respondent's n1otion for a directed 
Yerdict, and the ruling of the trial court in granting the 
motion should therefore be affirmed. 
III. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED, EVEN IF THE GROUNDS ASSIGNED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE, WHERE, AS 
HERE, IT APPEARS FROM THE ENTIRE RECORD THAT 
A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT. 
The trial court, in announcing the reason for his 
decision, stated that he believed that Gibbs was negli-
gent in the particulars hereinbefore discussed, and that 
the negligence of Gibbs concurred with the negligence 
of the cab driver. For the purposes of the motion, 
the trial court apparently assumed that the taxicab 
driver was negligent, and the_ additional negligence on 
the part of Gibbs in operating a bicycle without a light 
was apparently not considered. 
It is a familiar principle of law that if a trial 
court, in directing a verdict, commits error upon the 
basis of the announced grounds for his decision, the 
error is harmless if the record of the trial is such that 
a verdict for the defendant would be required in any 
event. Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 91 Utah 
405, 64 P. (2d) 351; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 
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1849, page 1334, and cases cited therein. Therefore, if 
this Court should feel some doubt as to the correctness 
of the ruling of the trial court, as viewed in the light 
of the reasons assigned at the time the motion for 
directed verdict was gr:anted, nevertheless the ruling 
of the trial court should be sustained, if upon the whole 
record it appears that a verdict for the defendant 
would have been required in any event. 
In addition to the specifications of active negli-
gence on the part of Gibbs, which have been discussed 
in some detail herein, we find the additional negligent 
omission of a light on the front of the bicycle. We 
assert that a failure to have a light, as required by the 
ordinance, is negligence per se. The ~purpose of the 
ordinance is to protect people on the thoroughfares of 
the city of Ogden, and to protect people with bicycles 
during the nighttime hours. A light is required in order 
that the presence of the bicycle will be revealed to the 
motoring public, as well 1as to the walking public. It 
is clear that if Gibbs had had a light on the front of 
the bicycle, there would have been some indication of 
the presence of the bicycle in the darkness outside 
the sc01pe of the headlights of the taxicab. Obviously, 
the illumination from the streetlight on the northeast 
corner was insufficient to reveal the presence of ~an 
unlighted bicycle in the care of a man wearing dark 
clothing on a dark, misty and rainy morning. The 
cab driver was observing the things and objects revealed 
I, 
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by his lights. This is eYidenced by the f,aet that he 
reacted instantaneously when the front wheel of the 
bicycle appeared in the rone of light cast out by his 
left headlight. Reasonable minds cannot differ on the 
proposition that Gibbs' failure to have a light on his 
bicycle was one of the f,actors which contributed to 
the happening of this accident. 
Although little has been said about it by counsel, 
we believe it important to urge, in support of our 
third point of argument, that the appellants have not 
produced sufficient evidence upon which to charge the 
respondent's driver with negligence which proximately 
caused the accident. At best, the evidence on this point 
is equally balanced, and it is just as logical to assume 
that the deceased, by his various acts of negligence, 
created a sudden peril, as it is to assume that the 
respondent's driver \Vas guilty of negligence which led 
to the accident. There is no evidence of excessive speed, 
nor is there evidence of improper lookout. In fact, the 
evidence in each particular is without contradiction 
that the speed was not excessive and that the lookout 
maintained by the driver of the cab was constant and 
proper, and resulted in a prompt swerving of the 
wheels, which prevented the deceased from being 
crushed rather than being merely grazed, as actually 
occurred. 
Therefore, the ruling of the trial court should be 
sustained, not only upon the grounds which were as-
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signed by the trial court at the time the ruling was made, 
but upon the additional grounds of further acts of negli-
gence on the part of the deceased and the lack ·of suffi-
cient proof of negligence on the part of the respond-
ent's driver. All of these grounds were asserted by 
respondent in its motion for a directed verdict (Tr. 
86), and when all of the grounds assigned for the 
motion 1are considered, it is clear that a verdict for 
the respondent was required in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
Although appellants devoted a considerable por-
tion of their brief to a discussion of ·cases from other 
jurisdictions bearing upon the points of argument urged 
by them, we have not felt it necessary to prolong this 
brief by a discussion of those cases. It is recognized 
that cases can be obtained from other jurisdictions to 
support almost any proposition of automobile law, in 
view of the tremendous number of cases which have 
been decided by the courts in the last thirty-five years. 
We are of the opinion that the law in Utah is well 
settled, and is adequate to serve as a precedent for 
the case at bar. This Court has had occasion to pass 
upon the principles of law which are involved in this 
case, and we think no good purpose would be served 
by urging a reconsideration of the doctrines previously 
announced by this Court, if such reconsideration is to 
he based upon a law of a foreign jurisdiction, some ,of 
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which is controlled by legislativl' enaetment and by the 
peculiar conditions which may havt> eonfronted the 
courts of those states as they decided the eases prP~ented. 
The facts in the case at bar ·are essentially without 
dispute. The inferences to be drawn frmn the proven 
facts are likewise essentially without dispute. The 
principles of law which have been announced by this 
Court in recent years should be reaffirmed, especially 
where, as here, the facts are such that reasona•ble men 
could not differ, and would be required to find that 
the deceased was guilty of negligence in at least one 
of the many particulars presented in details herein, and 
that such negligence contributed to the cause of this 
accident to such an extent that the accident would not 
have occurred but for that negligence. 
The action of the trial court should be sustained 
and the judgment affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
and JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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